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This paper provides an analysis of the governance-performance relations in public 
listed and family-controlled firms. After controlling of potential endogeneity problems, 
by suing GMM estimators, the results show that family firms perform better compared 
to nonfamily firms. The active family involvement in management positions implies 
high firm performance. The results also indicate that beside the fact that family 
management increase efficiency such control does not imply an increase in valuation 
levels, and thus may not accrue to minority shareholders. Moreover, the results also 
sustain an incentive alignment effect between the coalition of large shareholders and 
firm value. Thus, the results confirm that the incentive to collude or monitoring 
controlling shareholders is affected by the type of blockholder. Additionally, the results 
support evidence that board dominance is another channel through which families can 
extract private benefits. 
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Recent studies such Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Holderness et al., (1999) and La Porta 
el al., (1999) suggest that Berle and Means´ (1932) model of widely disperse corporate 
ownership is not common, even in developed countries. In fact, large shareholders such 
as family are common in public traded firms around the world. Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) show that one-third of S&P 500 firms are family controlled. In Western Europe, 
the majority of public held firms remain family-controlled (Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
Claessens et al., (2000) provide similar evidence for East Asia. Such controlling 
families often hold large equity stakes and frequently have executive representation 
(Burkart et al., 2003). 
 
The concentration of ownership and management in the hands of a family (which 
typically have managerial and board representation) has shifted the focus from the 
traditional conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholders (Berle and 
Means, 1932) towards an equally important agency conflict between large controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). A number of studies 
suggest that ownership concentration creates a trade-off between incentive alignment 
and entrenchment effects (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this context, the question 
of whether a family ownership hinders or facilitates firm performance becomes an 
empirical issue that is related to institutional and politico-regulatory factors (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003). Although, the notion that large concentrated shareholder are inherently 
less efficient is not a universal view. Combining ownership and control can be 
advantageous, as large shareholder can act to mitigate managerial expropriation. 
Shareholders with relative long investment horizons can mitigate the incentives for 
myopic investment decisions by managers and leading to greater investment efficiency 
(James, 1999). Empirical evidence reinforces the idea that family performs as well as, if 
not better than non-family firms (e.g., McCnnaughy et al., 1998; Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Maury, 2006). Thus, the conflicts of interest between minority shareholders and 
the controlling family rise when family control is tight (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In 
this context, families seek to entrench themselves and extract private benefits from the 
firm (La Porta et al., 1999). The lack of strong external monitors and discipline agents 
potentially permits them to pursuit this path. Thus, the monitoring activity seems to be 




Indeed, previous research shows that the presence of large shareholders can benefit 
minority shareholders by monitoring the actions of managers, consequently reduce 
profit diversion (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Nevertheless, these studies have 
focused on separate organizational outcomes of family/insider owners, outside 
blockholders and board characteristics in firm performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 2003). 
For example, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) provide empirical evidence that firm 
performance depends on the efficiency of a number of governance mechanisms, such as 
board independence, monitoring by large outside shareholders and incentive effects of 
directors´ shareholding. However, their research is focused on the roles of various 
governance mechanisms in mitigating principal-agent conflict associated with disperse 
share ownership. Thus, this study analyses the governance roles of various blockholders 
and corporate boards on firm performance in the context of family firms. More 
specifically, this study provides an analysis of governance-performance relationships 
using multi-industry dataset of 208 firms listed on Milan Stock Exchange (MSE) in 
2006. The option to study Italian firms is sustained on the one hand in preliminary 
results provide by Faccio and Lang (2002), who found substantial discrepancy between 
ownership and control in Italy, a situation which potentially aggravate problems 
associated with a combination of principal-agent and principal-principal relationships. 
In this environment, complementarities between ownership and board related 
governance factors may be particularly important; on the other hand analysing a single 
legal and institutional environment allow us to hold constant a number of important 
contextual factors. For instance, Shleifer and Wolfenzon, (2002) emphasize that 
ownership may vary across countries depending on their legal systems. This strategy 
also avoids endogeneity problems between ownership structure and country-specific 
institutional characteristics (e.g., Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
 
The Italian corporate sector also represents an important laboratory that provides an 
opportunity to develop further previous research and to make a number of contributions. 
First, it allow us to analyse corporate governance effects on performance in situations 
where the managers are frequently family members, where families are also represented 
on a firm’s board, and where they are often the major providers of capital, if not 
directly, then through relational holdings in other firms. Second, previous studies on 
family firms document a nonmonotonic relationship between family control and firm 




family opportunism may increase at high control levels; so, a closer analysis between 
the connection of family control and different types of monitoring, including 
independent boards members and financial institutions is an important research issue. 
Third, while previous research has focuses on separate organizational outcomes of 
family/insider owners, outside blockholder and board characteristic, this study provides 
an integrated framework that brings together the analysis of simultaneous performance 
effects of various insiders and outside investors, as well as their participation in 
corporate boards. Therefore, this paper also contributes to previous studies by showing 
that one governance channel may be complement for another. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews literature and discusses the 
expectations on the effect of family ownership, multiple blockholders and governance 
effects of boards on firm performance. Section 3, describes the data set, variables and 
provide a summary of statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.1. Family Ownership and Firm Performance 
 
A number of researches express concerns about the problems associate with family 
control, and the increase likelihood of the abuse of managerial power. Morck et al. 
(1988), Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), provide evidence of the negative effect of a 
controlling family on corporate performance. In addition, strategy research identifies 
family firms to be altruistic in the relationship between parents and children (Schulze et 
al., 2001), which may have an impact on the effective succession process when the 
founder retires. Moreover, family interest may dominate over the interest of non-family 
shareholders, since the concentration of personal and family wealth in owner-managed 
firms normally creates a preference for income and for wealth preservation over other 
dimensions of firm performance such as maximization of dividends payments to outside 
shareholders (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000). Additionally, family control tends to 




concentrated ownership reduces the probability of a hostile take-over (Barclay and 
Holderness, 1989; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). 
Although, whether families or professional managers run companies better for society 
in general is still open to debate. The current prolonged recession, corporate scandals 
and the collapse of stock markets have result in a return to the kind of values prevalent 
in family-owned companies. Family businesses that survived their own internal 
succession dramas have tended to taken a longer-term view rather than live and die by 
stock market evaluation of their performance (Casson, 1999). Because of the extension 
of altruism from the family system to the firm, owners in the current generation have 
the tendency and obligation to serve wealth for the next generation. As a result, family 
firms often possess longer horizons compared to non-family firms (James, 1999). 
Therefore family firms represent a special class of large shareholders that have unique 
incentive structure, a strong voice in the firm, and powerful motivation of managers 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Such characteristic can alleviate agency conflicts between 
the firms´ debt and equity claimants and reduce the agency costs of debt (Anderson et 
al., 2003). Because the family’s wealth is so closely linked to the firm welfare, families 
may have strong incentives to monitoring managers and minimize the free-riding 
problem inherent with diffused shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). If monitoring 
requires knowledge and information about firm technology and processes, families 
potentially provide superior oversight because of their length involvement with the firm 
(Morck et al., 1988; Burkart et al., 2003). 
 
The above arguments suggest that family ownership can lead to better monitoring of 
managerial discretion and reduce principal-agent costs associated with diffused share 
ownership. As a result family presence in the firm may provide a competitive advantage 
and improve short and long term performance. Sustained in previous arguments, this 
study hypothesizes that family control should increase firm performance. So, the first 
hypothesis states:  
 








2.2. Multiple Blockholders and Firm Performance 
 
The above arguments suggest that, other things equal, family control over the firm may 
be associated with superior oversight and strong incentives to monitor managers that 
should mitigate principal-agent cost. Families can seek to maximize firm performance 
but yet still create severe conflicts over the distribution of wealth among different 
groups of shareholders. Indeed, the concentration of ownership and management in the 
hands of a family gives a lot of power to that family and it enables them to take actions 
that are beneficial to the family and are detrimental to the minority owners (e.g., family 
paying themselves excessive compensation, consuming perquisites, pursuing non-profit 
objectives). As a result, the primary agency problem in this environment is not the 
failure of professional managers to satisfy the objectives of diffused shareholders, but 
rather the expropriation of minority shareholders by family interests (La Porta et al., 
2000) what Villalonga and Amit (2006) call a “principal-principal” or horizontal agency 
relationship. In this context family firms pose special concerns to outside (or minority) 
investors and represent challenges to good corporate governance. The potential for 
moral hazard conflict between the family and outside shareholders creates a new set of 
agency costs, including mutual monitoring and opportunity costs that may have an 
adverse effect on the firm performance. Therefore, divestments through sales of large 
blocks of shares to institutional investors may be a viable alternative to ownership 
dispersion from the minority shareholders point of view (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
Indeed, institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds, pension funds, insurance funds) have 
both the incentives and the means to restrain the self-serving behaviour of managers 
(Maug, 1998). For example, large shareholders may not allow a poor strategy such as 
diversification to evolve into poor performance, therefore decreasing the magnitude of 
restructuring; when managers have an opportunity to conduct a self-serving deal that 
damages shareholders, the decision to sell a block of shares to non-management 
investor’s increases shareholder wealth. Building on this research, this study states that: 
H2: The presence of institutional investors has a positive impact on firm performance. 
 
As suggested by Maury and Pajuste (2005) when families are in exceptional control 
positions, the presence of large shareholders can mitigate the potential for moral hazard 




the presence of several large shareholders with substantial block of shares is common 
(Barca and Bech, 2001). For European companies Faccio and Lang (2002) show that 39 
percent of firms have at least two blockholders that hold at least 10 percent of the voting 
rights and 16 percent of the firm have at least three blockholders
1
. The theoretical 
literature provides models in which multiple blockholders compete for control (Bloch 
and Hege, 2001), monitor the controlling shareholders (Winton, 1993) and form 
controlling coalitions to shares private benefits (Zwiebel, 1995; Pagano and Roell, 
1998). In fact, multiple blockholders can have two different roles in firms. On the one 
hand, by holding a substantial block of shares, a blockholder has the power and the 
incentives to monitor the largest shareholder and therefore the ability to reduce profit 
diversion. On the other hand can form a controlling coalition with other blockholders 
and share the diverted profit. According the Maury and Pajuste (2005) model´s the 
incentives to collude with or to monitoring the controlling shareholder is affected by the 
type of blockholder. In line with McConnell and Servaes (1990), Maury and Pajuste 
(2005) demonstrated that the propensity to extract benefits at the expenses of minority 
shareholders is likely to be lower if the controlling coalition includes a financial 
institution. Since the opportunity cost of getting caught for diverting the firm´s proceeds 
is higher for financial institutions that are supervised by regulatory authorities, so 
diversion is less likely to be an attractive. On these views, this study sustain that 
multiple blockholders have the ability to restrain management, consequently the 
controlling family from divert of profits. Therefore, the more shares a blockholder own 
the greater is their motivation to monitor the firm. Thus, the third hypothesis states that: 
 
H3: There is a positive relation between a more equal distribution of share ownership 
among the three largest shareholders and firm performance. 
 
A subsidiary hypothesis states that: 
 
H4: If the controlling coalition includes an institutional investor the firm performance 
should be greater. 
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2.3.The Governance Effect of Boards on Firm Performance 
 
The previous discussion links firm’s performance with the presence of large-block 
shareholders, such as family owners and outside institutional investors. Nevertheless, 
this combination of different large-shareholders may create its own problems. For 
instance, cultivating thrust between insiders and outsiders in a family-controlled 
business is difficult as owners are reluctant to share information they consider 
proprietary (Schulze et al., 2001). Paternalism also contributes to the highly centralized 
decision-making structure, concentrating power and control among people with family 
links to the owners of family firms. As pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) one 
of the greatest costs that large shareholders can impose is remaining active in 
management even if they are no longer competent or qualified to run the firm. Having 
the initial human capital deriving from family members, there is a tendency for owners´ 
entrenchment as managers in their firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). Although, family 
and institutional ownership concentration overcomes some of the agency costs 
associated with lack of legal protection of minority shareholders, other complementary 
governance mechanisms are needed to deal with possible entrenchment of dominant 
owners. 
 
Corporate governance studies increasingly recognize that board of directors has a 
central role in reducing agency problems (Hermalin and Wisbach, 2003; Schulze et al., 
2001). Effective monitoring is usually a function of structural factors such as the 
proportion of independence directors on the board, CEO/Chairman roles held jointly or 
separately. Therefore, institutional theorists suggest that board independence may be 
used as a signalling device by organizations that act to enhance or protect their 
legitimacy, especially in the investor community (Peng, 2004). In fact, existing studies 
on corporate-governance in family-controlled firms provided evidence that family 
members dominate the board of directors (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Management is 
exercised through a senior owner-manager who typically assumes the presidency of the 
firm and current holds the top executive position and therefore, has complete control of 
the firm and its decisions. The management of these firms in often autocratic, 
consequently minority shareholders may be disadvantage (Burkart et al., 1997, 2003). In 
this environment, research focus is studying organizational outcomes of directors´ 




On one hand, the previous arguments suggest that, family control may be associated 
with better performance. Therefore, the appointment of “controllers” that are related to 
the largest family may re-enforce positive effects of family ownership. On the other 
hand, this family control over board may lead to greater executive entrenchment and 
potential conflicts with outside investors, in particular with institutional shareholders 
whose strategy preferences may differ from the family. For instance, the altruism can 
bias the CEOs´ perception of their relatives employed on the board, which hampers 
their ability to monitor and discipline those. Family-related directors face higher exit 
costs because leaving the firm would mean forgoing certain rights, perquisites and 
privileges associated with being part of the controlling family. These high exit cost 
translate into a higher level of entrenchment
2
. Given an emphasis in the literature on the 
links between controlling coalitions of large shareholders and the effectiveness of the 
board, this study hypothesizes that non-family directors may have an important 
governance role that is complementary to monitoring by blockholders in terms of 
reconciling potentially different interests of the family and outside investors (especially 
minority investors) and leading to more efficient organizational outcomes. Building on 
this research, the five hypothesis states: 
 








The data set is obtained from AMADEUS, a private database provided by Bureau van 
Dijk. Italian firms listed in Milan Stock Exchange (MSE) with ownership data in 2006 
in the AMADEUS dataset were collected. Banks (SICs 6000-6900) and public utilities 
(SICs 4900-4999) are excluded given the nature of corporate governance in financial 
institutions differs from that in non-financial firms and because government regulation 
potentially affect firm performance (e.g., Faccio and Lasfer, 2001). The firms-specific 
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 Theoretical models on succession demonstrate that professional managers will be more productive than 
family descendants (due the restricted size of labor pool to choose from), but also hiring a professional 




control variables are calculated from 2000 through 2006. As a result the final sample 
comprises an unbalanced panel data of 208 non-financial firms. Data on board structure 
and CEO characteristics was taken from the BoradEx a database collected by Harvard 
University. 
 
3.2. Variables description  
 
Variable used are in four main groups: family and institutional ownership, board 
characteristics, measure of firm performance and control variables. The use of 
ownership structure as a proxy for corporate governance varies considerably in the 
literature. As pointed out by La Porta et al., (1999) a theoretical appropriate measure of 
ownership concentration requires a model of the interactions between large 
shareholders, which we do not have. So, in order to measure family control this study 
collects ultimate ownership data for a sample of 208 listed firms in M.S.E
3
.  In a first 
step, shareholders are classified based on the information related to the ultimate owner 
into the following type: family, corporation, financial institution, state and other (e.g, 
Faccio and Lang, 2002). In order to track control relationships rather than patrimonial 
relationships, the percentage recorded are those attached to voting rights of ultimate 
owner. Then, this study identifies the three largest shareholders in each firm. 
 
Following Maury (2006) and Andersan and Reeb (2003) this study uses two dummy 
variable to identify family firms. The first variable, called Family is set equal to one if 
global ultimate owner is a family, an individual, or an unlisted firm, and zero otherwise. 
Unlisted firms are classified as family firms because they are often closely held (Faccio 
and Lang, 2002). The second variable, Family-managed is set equal to one if the 
controlling shareholder is a family or an individual who holds the CEO, Honorary 
Chairman, Chairman, or Vice Chairman position, and zero otherwise. This variable 
controls for active versus passive family ownership (e.g., Andersan and Reeb, 2003). 
The dummy variable Widely Held is used to control for firms that do not have any 
controlling shareholders (i.e., firms classified by Amadeus with the indicator A, which 
indicates that any shareholder do not have more than 25% directly or indirectly in the 
firm). Moreover, the dummy variable Nonfamily takes the value one if the controlling 
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shareholder is not classified as family or widely held firm, and zero otherwise. The 
variable ownership measures the fractional equity ownership held by the largest 
shareholder. Based on previous research (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) that show that 
institutional investors, such as financial institutions, mutual or pension funds play a 
significant role in monitoring and discipline managers, this study defines the variable 
Blockholder as a dummy variable that assumes the value one if there is an institutional 
investor with at least 5% of equity holdings, and zero otherwise. To measure the 
capacity of other large shareholders in reducing profit diversion by monitoring 
controlling shareholders, this study uses two variables to measure the allocation of 
control between multiple blockholders (e.g., Maury and Pajuste, 2005). The first 
variable is the HI-Differences measured by the sum of the squares of the differences 





. The second variable namely HI-







). Both variables are transformed into natural 
logarithms to control for the skeweness
4
. Additionally, this study defines two dummy 
variables to control the type of shareholder in the controlling coalition. The first one 
namely Family 2
nd
 shareholder, which takes the value one if a family is the second 
largest shareholder, and zero otherwise; the second namely Nonfamily 2
nd
 shareholder 
equals one if the second shareholder is not a family, and zero otherwise. 
 
Several variables are used to measure board characteristics, such as composition, size, 
and leadership. In terms of board composition, previous studies differentiate between 
“insider” directors (e.g., current and retired firm employees, their family members) and 
“affiliate directors” whose relations with the firm is restricted to their board membership 
only (see Anderson and Reeb, 2004, for a discussion). Although, because this study is 
interested on the organizational outcomes of board members´ direct family links with 
family owners, the board independence from the family was operationalised using four 
variables. The first variable controls for the size of the Board (the natural log of the total 
members in the board). The second variable, the percentage of independent directors (% 
IndepDirectors) is the percentage of the total seats on the board of directors and 
supervisors whose only affiliation with the firm is their directorship. This study also 
                                                          
4




considers a measure of CEO compensation due the relation between executive pay and 
firm performance (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Cheng and Firth, 2006). Thus, the 
variable Bonus is defines as the bonus paid as a percentage of total pay
5
. Compensation 
data comes from BoardEx a database collected by Harvard University. Because only 24 
firms’ report data related to board compensation, thus, the analysis of governance 
effects of boards on performance is restricted to those firms (section 4.3). Due the fact 
that both databases do not have information related to the equity holdings of officers 
and directors (less family ownership) no variable could be defined to capture the 
incentive effects of other insiders´ ownership. The fourth variable is a dummy variable 
Chairman which denotes 1 if the chairman is also the chair of the board, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
To measure firm performance, this study uses Tobin´s q and return on assets (ROA) as 
primary performance measures. Following La Porta et al., (2000) Tobin´s Q was 
estimated as the market value of common equity plus the book value of total assets 
minus common equity divided by the book value of total assets
6
. To compute the 
variable ROA this study uses earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the 
book value of total assets. Five additional variables are introduced to control factors that 
have been shown to have an impact on firm performance (eg., Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of book value of total assets. To 
control for debt in the capital structure this study employs the ratio total debt over total 
assets. Growth in net sales is sued to proxy for the value of growth opportunities. The 
investment intensity is measured by capital expenditures relative to total assets. The firm 
risk is the standard deviation of the ratio of net income to total assets. Age is the 




Table 1 presents statistics on average Tobin´s q in different owner categories by 
industrial classification. The industrial classification follows the classification proposed 
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 Because firms do not disclose information related to bonus pay schemes we have no details on how the 
bonuses are derived. 
6
 The ratio market to book value is the most common measure in empirical corporate governance research 






. Family firms are presented in all industries, indicating that 
families operate in a broad of industries. Nevertheless, family firms appear to be 
prevalent in organizational forms in Textile and Trade Industries. These results suggest 
the importance of controlling for industry affiliation in empirical analysis. So, this study 
includes dummy variables to denote each two-digit SIC code. 
 
Table 1 








 Freq. % 
Mean 
Q 
 Freq. % 
Mean 
Q 
Petroleum 10 8.55% 1.52  2 4.26% 1.74  4 3.42% 2.27 
Consumer  
Durables 
6 5.13% 1.53  4 8.51% 1.36  3 2.56% 1.72 
Basic Industry 13 11.11% 1.48  6 5.13% 1.67  4 3.42% 0.85 
Food and 
Tobacco 
1 0.85% 0.87  1 0.85% 2.91  0 0.00% ____ 
Construction 9 7.69% 1.51  4 3.42% 0.80  8 6.84% 2.69 
Capital Goods 4 3.42% 1.61  0 0.00% ____  0 0.00% ____ 
Transportation 16 13.68% 1.64  5 4.27% 1.49  9 7.69% 1.43 
Textiles and 
Trade 
25 21.37% 2.60  6 5.13% 2.32  7 5.98% 2.78 
Services 8 6.84% 2.30  11 9.40% 2.84  3 2.56% 2.73 
Leisure 6 5.13% 2.73  0 0.00% ____  1 0.85% 2.66 
Others 19 16.24% 1.88  8 6.84% 1.55  5 4.27% 3.17 
The ownership categories are: Family, the controlling shareholders is a family, an individual, or an 
unlisted firm; Widely Held the firm has no controlling shareholder; Nonfamily the controlling shareholder 
is not classified as family and not Widely Held. Mean Q is the average of Tobin´s q value measured by 
market value of common equity plus the book value of total assets minus common equity divided by book 
value of total assets. Industry description is based on Campbell (1996) classification. 
 
Table 2 provides means and medians for the key variables and differences of means 
tests for different ownership categories. For the variables Tobin´s q, ROA, size, 
leverage, growth, investment intensity and risk, the means tests are based on time-series 
average for each firm in the sample (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Family firms 
represent 56% (117/208) of the Italian sample firms. From these, 57% (67/117) the 
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 According Campbell (1966) industries are defined as follow: Petroleum (SIC 13,29), Consumer durables 
(SIC 25,30,36,37,50,55,57), Basic Industry (SIC 10,12,14,24,26,28,33), Food and Tobacco (SIC 
1,2,9,20,21,54), Construction (SIC 15,16,17,32,52), Capital goods (SIC 34,35,38), Transportation (SIC 
40,42,44,45,47), Textile and trade (SIC 22,23 ,31,5153,56,59), Services (SIC 72,73,75,76,80,82,87,89), 
Leisure (SIC 27,58,70,78,79) and Other includes all companies whose SIC codes are not assigned to any 




CEO, chairman or Vice Chairman comes from the controlling family. Firms without 
any controlling shareholder represent 23% (47/208) of the sample firms. With respect to 
accounting performance, measured by the variable ROA, the results show that family 
firms have higher return on assets than widely held firms, whereas return on assets are 
not statistically significant between family and nonfamily firms. Regarding family-
managed firms, the results indicate that family-managed firms are significantly at 1% 
level better performers compared to family nonmanaged firms. Using Tobin´s q as the 
performance measure, the results show no statistically differences between the three 














Summary Statistics by Ownership 
















Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  t-stat  t-stat  t-stat 
Tobin´s q                              2.00 1.58  2.00  1.95  2.13  1.84  2.13  -0.96  0.70  1.18 
ROA 0.10 0.09  0.10  0.13  0.06  0.04  0.09  -3.64***  -0.26  -4.38*** 
Ownership 45.92 50  53.61  54.21  52.55  18.75  54.72  -18.94***  0.41  -0.58 
Blockholder 0.77 1.00  0.74  0.74  0.72  0.91  0.70  3.10***  -0.46  -0.26 
HI-Concentration 7.76 7.93  8.22  8.29  8.11  6.22  8.17  -14.91***  -0.40  -1.55 
HI-Differences 6.34 7.14  7.21  7.14  7.28  3.20  7.44  -8.45***  1.28  0.63 
Board 6.74 6.00  6.48  6.84  6.02  6.93  7.26  0.80  1.13  -1.39 
% IndepDirectors 0.79 0.83  0.76  0.61  0.94  0.82  0.85  1.47  2.24*  10.50*** 
Chairman 0.47 0.00  0.59      0.29  0.37  -3.58***  -2.36*  -10.47*** 
Bonus 1.18 0.00  1.35  1.86  0.42  0.38  1.43  -2.19**  0.07  -2.14** 
Size 12.46 12.25  12.30  12.56  12.03  12.43  12.97  0.96  5.43***  -4.44*** 
Leverage 0.23 0.22  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.20  0.24  -2.93**  0.79  -1.09 
Investment Intensity 0.32 0.05  0.32  0.24  0.43  0.42  0.24  0.65  -1.00  1.60 
Growth 0.19 0.08  0.18  0.16  0.22  0.23  0.25  0.69  0.79  1.11 
Risk 0.66 0.65  0.68  0.68  0.67  0.64  0.62  -1.77  -2.25*  -0.32 
Age 27.74 20.00  26.21  29.67  22.48  25.09  34.64  -2.27  1.51  -1.59 




The table presents summary statistics for 208 non-financial Italian firms. The performance variables are: 
Tobins´s q value measured by market value of common equity plus the book value of total assets minus 
common equity divided by book value of total assets and return on assets (ROA) measured by earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book value of total assets. The ownership categories are: Family, a 
dummy variable that equals one if the controlling shareholders is a family, an individual or an unlisted firm 
and zero otherwise; Family-managed, is set equal to one if the controlling shareholder is a family or an 
individual who holds the CEO, Honorary Chairman, Chairman, or Vice Chairman position, and zero 
otherwise; Widely Held, a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has no controlling shareholder; 
Nonfamily, a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the controlling shareholder is not classified as family 
and not widely held, and zero otherwise. Ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the largest 
shareholder; Blockholder is a dummy variable that equals one if there is an institutional investor with at least 
5% of ownership in the firm; HI-Concentration is the natural logarithm of the sum of squares of the equity of 
the three largest owners´; HI-Differences is the natural logarithm of the sum of the squares of the differences 
between the first and the second largest shareholder, and the second and the third largest shareholder; Board is 
the natural log of the total members in the Board; % IndepDirectors is the percentage of the total seats on the 
board of directors and supervisors whose only affiliation with the firm is their directorship; Chairman, a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the chairman is also the CEO of the Board zero otherwise; Bonus is 
the bonus paid as a percentage of total pay; Size is the natural logarithm  of total assets; Leverage is the total 
debt over total assets; Growth is the growth in net sales; Investment Intensity is the ratio of capital 
expenditures over total assets; Risk is the standard deviation of the ration net income to total assets; Age is 
natural logarithm of years since firm inception. 
(*), (**) and (***) Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Concerning ownership, the results confirm that onwership is more concentrated in 
family firms as well as in nonfamily firms compared to widely held firms. Indeed, for 
the variables HI-Concentration and HI-Differences the differences between means are 
statistically significant at 1% level only between family firms and widely held firms. 
Concerning, to corporate governance variables, beside the fact that for the variables 
Board and percentage of independent directors the differences of means are not 
statistically different for any group, for the dummy variable Chairman, only for 29% of 
the widely held firms the CEO is also the chairman. This result contrast with the result 
reported by family firms (the means is 59%). Indeed, the percentage of Bonus paid is 
much higher in family firms compared to widely held firms. Furthermore, the 
differences between family managed and nonmanaged firms is statistically significant at 
1% level, which indicates that families will ensure that management (through 




average are bigger than family nonmanaged firms, although all the firms show a 
substantial size. Family firms appear to use more debt than widely held firms. Family 
firms employ 23% of debt on their capital structure compared to 20% for widely held 
firms. Regarding the variables growth, investment intensity, age and risk no statistically 
differences were found. Summarizing, the univariate analysis confirms that the 
management as well as the ownership is in the hands of a family. In these 
circumstances, if families seek entrench themselves and extract private benefits from the 
firm, the lack of strong external monitors and discipline agents potentially permits them 
to pursue this path. Appendix B presents the single correlation matrix for the variables 
in the sample. 
 
 
4. Regression results 
 
Modelling the relation between corporate governance factors and firm performance has 
generally been approached through standard econometric techniques such as regression 
analysis. The real problem arises around the issue of endogeneity, and much of the 
robustness testing in this study is concerned with statistical procedures that investigate 
the existence of endogenous variables and correcting for this where it is found (e.g., 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). To address endogeneity problems this study uses the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Arellano, 2003), which correct for 
endogeneity by using instruments. Specially, this study follows the analysis of Hermelin 
and Weibach (1991) that is this study uses the lagged values of ownership variables as 
their instruments because some changes in ownership occur within firms over the time. 
To test for the over-identifying restrictions, this study employs the Sargan test which 
tests for the absence of correlation between instruments and the error term. To control 
for unobserved firms’ effects this study uses panel data. On the basis of the discussion 
in the previous sections, the basic form of the model used by this study is: 
 
Firm performanceit=α+β1(Family firmsit)+β2(Control Variablesit)+β3(Industry Dummy 
Variables)+ηi+λt+εit           (1) 
where firm performance is measure using Tobin´s q and ROA. Family firm is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the global ultimate owner is a family, an individual or an 




investment intensity, risk and age. ηi is the firm fixed effects; λt is year fixed-effects and 
νit is the error term. 
 
4.1. Family ownership effect on firm performance 
 
Table 3 presents the results related to the relation between family ownership and firm 
performance. In the columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 the dependent variable is the variable Tobin´s 















































      












































































     
-0.001*** 
(-30.240) 




































































































































































































Two Digit SIC Code Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 




The table presents regression of firm performance on family ownership and control variables. The 
dependent variables are Tobin´s q value measured by market value of common equity plus the book 
value of total assets minus common equity divided by book value of total assets on columns 1 to 4 and 
return on assets (ROA) measured by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book value 
of total assets on columns 5 to 8. The independence variables are: Family, a dummy variable that equals 
one if the controlling shareholders is a family, an individual or an unlisted firm and zero otherwise; 
Family-managed, is set equal to one if the controlling shareholder is a family or an individual who holds 
the CEO, Honorary Chairman, Chairman, or Vice Chairman position, and zero otherwise; Widely Held, a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm has no controlling shareholder; Nonfamily, a dummy variable 
that is set equal to one if the controlling shareholder is not classified as family and not widely held, and 
zero otherwise. Ownership is the percentage of ownership held by the largest shareholder; Blockholder 
is a dummy variable that equals one if there is an institutional investor with at least 5% of ownership in 
the firm; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Leverage is the total debt over total assets; Growth 
is the growth in net sales; Investment Intensity is the ratio of capital expenditures over total assets; Risk 
is the standard deviation of the ration net income to total assets; Age is natural logarithm of years since 
firm inception. (*), (**) and (***) Significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The principal result from table 3 is that family ownership is positively associated with 
firm performance when both measure of performance (i.e., Tobin´s q and ROA) are 
considered, in line with the first hypothesis. Specifically, the results show that under the 
family control the firm valuation (Tobin´s q) is similar for family firms and widely held 
firms (regression 1). Although, when ROA is used as performance metric (regression 5), 
family firms report about 11% higher firm profitability in relative terms (i.e., family 
coefficient/ average ROA of family firms, 0.011/0.10). Indeed, the group of widely held 
firms reports a negative coefficient. Thus, this result provides empirical evidence that 
family firms perform better compared to nonfamily firms, that is, firms with no 
controlling shareholder. These results support the idea that families have longer 
investment horizons, leading to greater investment efficiency. Furthermore, beyond 
monitoring and control advantages, family can bring special knowledge to the firm that 
outside managers do not possess. So, to control the effect of active versus passive 
family control on firm performance, the variable family-managed, which takes the value 
one if the controlling shareholder is a family or an individual who holds the CEO, or 
Chairman position, and zero otherwise is introduced in regressions 2 and 6. The 
coefficient estimated on family-managed is positive and statistically significant at 1% 




17% (i.e., family coefficient/ average ROA of family firms, 0.017/0.10) relative to other 
firms. Thus, these results confirm that active family involvement in management 
position implies high firm performance. Although, because previous research suggest 
that the relationship between equity ownership structure and firm performance may be 
nonlinear if the incentive structure of equity claimant changes as the holdings increase 
(e.g. Morck et al., 1988), the square of the variable ownership is introduced as a 
continuous variable in regressions 3 and 7. The negative coefficient of the variable 
square of ownership indicates a nonmonotonic relation between firm performance even 
when both measure of performance are considered. The results are similar if the analysis 
includes using dummy variables to denote families with different ownership stakes 
(results available upon to request from the authors). Thus, these results suggest that 
family opportunism may increase at high control levels. Although, when family control 
(i.e., family control in terms of board) is analysed on a sub sample of family firms 
(regressions 4 and 8), the results show that the increasing of 14% (i.e., family 
coefficient/ average ROA of family firms, 0.014/0.1) in accounting performance is not 
followed by an increase in firm valuation in the same magnitude. The increase is only 
0.6% (family managed coefficient/average Tobins´q of family firms; 0.012/2.0). Taken 
together these results suggest that family management can increase efficiency but such 
control does not imply an increase in valuations levels. Furthermore, for comparison 
widely held firms, in which there is no controlling shareholder, appear to have 
approximately equally Tobin´s q (but not higher profit rates) compared to family firm. 
One possible explanation for the positive valuation of diffused owned firms, arises from 
the liquidity and risk-diversification benefits obtained through such dispersed ownership 
structures. Therefore family control has a different impact on the profitability compared 
to valuation and thus difference could be driven by the agency problem between the 
controlling family and minority shareholders. This result is confirmed by the results 
obtained for the dummy variable Blockholders. The coefficient of this variable is 
positive and statistically significant in all regressions. This result suggests that multiple 
blockholders positively moderate the effects of family control, which provides support 
to the second hypothesis. Therefore the incentive to monitor or conclude with the 
leading shareholder becomes important from a valuation/performance perspective. 
Regarding the control variables, the results indicate that firm’s value (Tobin´s q and 
ROA) is positively related to size and investment intensity. The variables leverage, 




reported to control variables are generally consistent with results of previous research 
(e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006).  
 
4.2. The multiple blockholders effects on firm performance 
 
Table 2 shows that family-controlled firms almost always have managerial 
representation. This result suggest that private benefits could substantially increase (and 
the firm value decrease) if the ability to monitor the insiders is low. So, this section 
analyses the connections between the presence of multiple blockholders, who can 








Table 4:  




































       
0.013*** 
(30.508) 




       
-0.0003*** 
(-2.852) 
      
HI-Differences   
0.013*** 
(32.530) 
       
0.012*** 
(67.157) 
    
HI-Differences*Family   
-0.002*** 
(-8.817) 
       
-0.001*** 
(-8.402) 
    
Family 2
and
Shareholder     
-0.0257*** 
(-28.553) 






Shareholder       
0.015*** 
(13.069) 











































































































































































Two Digit SIC Code Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 




The table presents regression of firm performance on multiple blockholders and control variables. The 
dependent variables are Tobin´s q value measured by market value of common equity plus the book 
value of total assets minus common equity divided by book value of total assets on columns 1 to4 and 
return on assets (ROA) measured by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book value 
of total assets on columns 5 to 8. The independent variables are: HI-Concentration is the natural 
logarithm of the sum of squares of the equity of the three largest owners´; HI-Differences is the natural 
logarithm of the sum of the squares of the differences between the first and the second largest 
shareholder, and the second and the third largest shareholder; Family is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the controlling shareholders is a family, an individual or an unlisted firm and zero otherwise; Family 2
nd
 
Shareholder, a dummy variable that takes the value one if the second largest shareholder is a family and 
zero otherwise; Nonfamily 2
nd
 shareholder, a dummy variable that takes the value one if the second 
shareholder is a non family owner; Size is the natural logarithm  of total assets; Leverage is the total debt 
over total assets; Growth is the growth in net sales; Investment Intensity is the ratio of capital 
expenditures over total assets; Risk is the standard deviation of the ratio net income to total assets; Age is 
natural logarithm of years since firm inception; Age is natural logarithm of years since firm inception. 
(*), (**), (***) Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Both variables HI-Differences and HI-Concentration measuring the differences in the 
equity stakes among the three largest shareholders and the total concentration of 
ownership in the hands of the three main blockholders, respectively, when interacting 
with the variable family report a negative and statistically coefficient at 1% level. A 
negative coefficient indicates that a more equal distribution among the largest 
blockholders has a positive effect in both measures of performance. Thus, these results 
confirm the hypothesis 3 which states that there is a positive relation between a more 
equal distribution of share ownership between the three largest shareholders and firm 
performance. These results are consistent with Benendeson and Wolfenzon (2000) 
model’s, which show an alignment effect of a coalition of large shareholders, that is a 
positive relation between the cash-flow stake of the controlling coalition and the firm 
value. Although, beside the fact that large shareholders can benefit minority 
shareholders by monitoring the actions of managers the level f private benefits may 
actually depend on the type of blockholder. Thus, to examine the role of different types 
of blockholders in family controlled firms, this study introduces two dummy variables 
related to the identity of the second largest shareholder. The first variable namely 
Family 2
nd
 Shareholder takes the value one if the second largest shareholder is a family 
and zero otherwise. The second variable, Nonfamily 2
nd




if the second shareholder is a non family owner. The (unrecorded) distribution of 
ownership types among the second large shareholders reveals that the families dominate 
with 37% whereas financial institutions report 19%. Regressions (3) and (4) show the 
results related to the variable Tobin´s q. Regression (6) and (7) present the results 
related to the variable ROA. The positive coefficient of the variable Nonfamily 2
nd
 
shareholder indicates a positive and highly significant effect on both measures of 
performance (regression 4 and 8). If the second shareholder is a family the positive 
impact on accounting performance is not translate into an increase in terms of valuation 
(regression 5 and 7). This result, in line with Faccio et al., (2001) suggests that some 
coalitions (such as two families) can make profit diversion easier, while in other 
coalitions expropriation can be more difficult. Indeed, it is easier for two families to 
form a coalition and extracts private benefits within the legal bounds than for a coalition 
that includes an institutional investor. This assumption seems plausible because such 
owners have different objectives and decision making horizons. Furthermore, such 
investors have a higher cost of engaging in profit diversion activities since they are 
subject to more scrutiny from regulatory authorities. Summarizing, the results strongly 
confirm the third and four hypotheses, that is, the presence of multiple blockholders 
have a positive effect on firm performance. Furthermore, the level of private benefits 
depends on the type of blockholders. So, the identity of the shareholders is relevant for 
understanding corporate governance. Regarding the control, variables, the results are 
quite similar to those obtain in table 3. 
 
4.3. The governance effect of boards on firm performance 
 
Previous results show that family ownership can be advantageous because the family 
has the incentive and the power to monitor managers. Nonetheless, the results also 
reveal a nonmonotonic relation between family control and firm performance, 
suggesting that family opportunism may increase at high control levels. Furthermore, 
the presence of multiple blockholders seems moderate the effects of family control. 
Although, the incentives to monitor or collude with the leading shareholder are affected 
by the type of blockholders. In this context, the conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms are less effective (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). Thus, this section 
analyses the role of independent directors in promoting firm performance. Table 5 




regressions (1) and (3) support the hypothesis five, which states that the board 
independence from the controlling families is positively associated with firm 
performance. Because the variable Bonus reports different results regarding the 
performance measures, that is Tobin´s q versus, regression 2 and 4 includes an 
interactive variable between family firms and the board independence. The interaction 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that the board 
independence is at stake. Thus, the family´s influences as such that potentially 
outweighs outside directors’ influence in board matters, consequently, family can 
pursue their own interests without substantial interference from the board. This 
interpretation is reinforced by the result of the variable Chairman. The positive 
coefficient of this variable indicates that when the chairman is also the CEO, the higher 
accounting performance is not translated into higher valuations suggesting a direct 
association between family ownership and managerial entrenchment and extraction of 

























Table 5:  





































%IndepDirector*Family   
-0.051*** 
(-49.609) 















































































































Two Digit SIC Code Included  Included  Included  Included 
Number of Observation 166  83  166  83 
The table presents regression of the firm performance on the effect of governance effect of boards and control 
variables. The dependent variables are Tobin´s q value measured by market value of common equity plus the book 
value of total assets minus common equity divided by book value of total assets on columns 1and 2 and return on 
assets (ROA) measured by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the book value of total assets on 
columns 3 and 4. The independent variables are: Board is the natural log of the total members in the Board); % 
IndepDirectors is the percentage of the total seats on the board of directors and supervisors whose only affiliation 
with the firm is their directorship; Chairman, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the chairman is also the 
CEO of the board zero otherwise; Bonus is the bonus paid as a percentage of total pay; Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; Leverage is the total debt over total assets; Growth is the growth in net sales; 
Investment Intensity is the ratio of capital expenditures over total assets; Risk is the standard deviation of the 
ration net income to total assets; Age is natural logarithm of years since firm inception; Age is natural logarithm of 
years since firm inception. 






This paper analyses the effect of ownership structure, the role of multiple blockholders 
and board characteristics on performance in public listed and family-controlled firms. 
By using GMM estimators to control for potential endogeneity problems, the results 
show that family firms have better accounting performance relative to non-family firms. 
Thus, family ownership seems to reduce managerial opportunism. Indeed, active family 
ownership in which the family holds the CEO or Chairman position improves the firm 
profitability. But this improvement is not reflected in firm value and thus may not 
accrue to minority shareholders. The results also show a nonmonotinic relation between 
ownership and performance, which suggest that at high control levels, the potential for 
family opportunism increases and valuation start to decline. Thus, monitoring activity is 
critical in family-controlled firms. In fact, the results indicate a positive relation 
between the firm performance and the presence of multiple blockholders. This result is 
consistent with a blockholder coalition framework that sustains an incentive alignment 
effect of a coalition of large shareholder and firm value. Moreover, the results also show 
that the incentive to collude with or to monitoring the controlling shareholder is affected 
by the type of blockholder. In other words, multiple blockholders, especially 
institutional investors have a positive impact on firm performance by mitigating 
principal-principal conflicts associated to family control. The results also provide 
evidence that board dominance is another channel through which families can extract 
private benefits of control. Summarizing, this study contributes to understanding the 
link between family control and firm performance, by showing that the firm 
performance depends on the efficiency of various governance mechanism such as 
various blockholders and board characteristics. Nevertheless, a number of extensions of 
this research can also be suggested. For instance, it is important to verify board 
appointment mechanisms that are used by family firms. More specially, since external 
board members may be vetted and approved by the family or other dominant 
blockholders what is the extent of their independence from the dominant owners? 
Because, this study focus on direct, family links between board members and family-
owners, consequently, it does not account for “affiliate” directors, that is, non-family 
board members with business ties to the firm. So, further research of the governance 
rules of these board members would be useful. The findings of this research also 




analysis of factors affecting board composition and share ownership. Thus, an analysis 
of efficiency out comes of various combinations of board and ownership characteristics 






Panel A1: BvDEP independence indicator 
 
The BvDEP independence indicator classifies the degree of independence of a company 
regard to its shareholders. The independence indicators are noted A, B, C, D and U. A 
firm with known recorded shareholders none of which having more than 25% of direct 
or total ownership is classified with the indicator A. According BvDEP terminology “A 
companies” are classified as independent. If a known recorded shareholders have an 
ownership percentage above 25 percent but none of which with an ownership 
percentage over 50 percent, the firm is classified with the indicator B. The indicator C is 
attached to any company with recorded shareholders with total ownership over 50 
percent. A company with a recorded shareholder with a direct ownership over 50 
percent is classified with indicator D. The indicator U is allocated to companies with 
unknown degree of independence. 
 
Panel A2: Ultimate Owner identification 
 
To define the Ultimate Owner (UO), BvDEP database analysis the shareholding 
structure of a company having a BvDEP independence indicator different from A, 
which means that the company is independent, consequently, has no UO. The first step 
is to identify the shareholder with the highest direct or total percentage of ownership. If 
this shareholder is independent (to be independent, the shareholder must be independent 
by it self, that is, an entity having one of the following type: individuals and families, 
Public authorities/State, employees/managers/directors must be classified with the 
independence indicator A), it is defined as the UO of the subject company. If the highest 
shareholder is not independent, the same process is repeated to him until BvDEP finds 
an UO. To define the UO this study uses as the minimum percentage to characterize the 
path from a subject company to its UO is 25.01%. In order to track control relationships 
rather than patrimonial relationships, the percentages recorded are those attached to the 






Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Tobin´s q 1                    
2. ROA 0.25*** 
(7.38) 
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